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Revealing side effects of quota rules on group cooperation 
Abstract 
The quota rule in employment is a legal tool to promote gender equality in professions and 
positions where women are underrepresented. An accompanying assumption is that gender 
diversity positively affects one of the aspects of team performance in form of group cooperation. 
However, it is unclear whether this positive effect can be achieved if diversity increases due to a 
quota rule. In two fully incentivized experiments involving a real-effort task (N1 = 188 and N2 = 
268), we examined the impact of quotas as compared to performance-based promotion on group 
cooperation. We thereby categorized participants either with regard to gender or to an artificial 
category that was randomly assigned. Cooperation within groups declined when promotion was 
based on quota compared to performance-based promotion, irrespective of the categorization 
criterion. Further analyses revealed that this negative effect of quota rules on cooperation is not 
driven by procedural fairness perceptions or expectations about performance of the promoted 
group member. Implications of the results for the implementation of equality and diversity 
initiatives are discussed. 
Keywords: affirmative action; group processes; gender quota; cooperation; diversity; gender 
equality 
JEL: C92, D23, J78, M14 
PsycINFO: 3020, 3660 
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Revealing side effects of quota rules on group cooperation 
1. Introduction 
 Despite significant advances during the past decades, a large gap exists between the 
representation of men and women in the labor force. The underrepresentation of women is 
particularly striking in high-profile business positions, such as company executives or board 
members (International Labour Organization, 2012). The facts are clear and the social and 
economic importance of achieving gender equality in the workplace is undisputable. Yet, there is 
a lack of consensus regarding the types of measures that should be applied in order to introduce 
gender equality in the workforce. A variety of measures have been proposed, from those that aim 
to address specific obstacles commonly faced by women (such as improved childcare provisions) 
to those that focus more directly on the promotion of women, be it through the provision of 
additional training, or through the implementation of mandatory quotas.1 From among the 
various gender equality and diversity policies, the introduction of mandatory gender quotas has 
attracted the greatest controversy. Until recently, quotas for women were mainly restricted to 
political participation (i.e., in national parliaments, Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2014). However, 
quotas have now become a popular strategy for increasing women’s representation in other 
sectors as well, such as on corporate boards (Catalyst, 2014).  
 On the one hand, policymakers who propose the introduction of a gender quota in public 
agencies and private organizations do so because this strategy guarantees the increase in 
women’s representation in a specific position or domain within a relatively short period. Besides 
this immediate benefit, legislators claim that introducing quotas for boards of directors in listed 
                                                          
1 Measures undertaken in order to achieve equality for members of groups that have been disadvantaged in the past 
are known under the term ‘affirmative action’ or ‘positive action’. For a definition, see European Commission, 
International perspectives on positive action measures. A comparative analysis in the European Union, Canada, the 
United States and South Africa, 2009. 
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companies will bring additional benefits in the form of increased corporate performance. For 
example, a report from the European Commission points out that the “presence of women [on 
boards] contributes to improving corporate governance, team performance and the quality of 
decision-making” (European Commission, 2012, p.13). A crucial—but as yet under-
researched—aspect of this debate is whether or not these benefits of gender diversity can indeed 
be achieved through the implementation of quotas. In particular, it is as yet unclear whether or 
not a quota procedure positively affects an important feature of group performance, namely 
cooperation. In this paper, we report two experiments carried out to test whether or not this is the 
case by examining the effect of quotas on cooperation, understood as people’s actions that 
“promote the goals of the group” (Tyler & Blader, 2000 p. 3) when individual outcomes depend 
upon the performance of the other group members (Wageman & Baker, 1997). In particular, we 
test how purely performance-based vs. category-based (quotas) promotion procedures influence 
group cooperation between incumbent members of a group and newcomers.  
 Numerous experimental studies have researched the impact of gender diversity on group 
decision making, i.e., in entrepreneurship tasks (Hoogendoorn, Oosterbeek, & van Praag, 2013) 
and different aspects of performance, such as generosity (Dufwenberg & Muren, 2006). 
Furthermore, it has been experimentally investigated how gender diversity influences group 
cooperation using both - effort choices (Ortmann & Tichy, 1999) and real effort tasks (Ivanova-
Stenzel & Kübler, 2011). Similar to these studies we focus on group cooperation. However, 
differently from previous research, we do not examine the impact of gender diversity on 
cooperation. Instead, we investigate how group cooperation is influenced by quota-based 
promotion procedures compared to performance-based procedures. Previous research on the 
effects of affirmative action has focused on individual task performance, job satisfaction, and 
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task selection (for overviews, see Crosby, Iyer, & Sincharoen, 2006; Heilman & Alcott, 2001), 
but did not investigate group performance, or cooperation within teams. More recent research 
has provided relevant insights into this problem (Balafoutas & Sutter, 2012; Mollerstrom, 2012), 
but has left important questions unanswered, some of which are addressed in this project. 
Specifically, we address the following questions: 
1. Does group cooperation decrease when promotion is based on a quota rule as compared 
to performance? 
2. Does a quota-based promotion affect group cooperation differently when it is applied to 
gender than when it is applied to an artificial and randomly assigned category? 
3. Is a quota-based promotion into a high-status group2 perceived as less fair than a 
performance-based procedure? 
4. If so, is this effect of promotion rule mediated by differences in fairness perceptions? 
 
1.1. Previous findings concerning the effects of affirmative action 
 
 Prior research has mainly focused on how different affirmative action policies in general, 
and quota rules in particular, are perceived and what impact they have on an individual’s 
behavior. A core finding in this literature is that affirmative action can undermine the self-esteem 
of its beneficiaries (women), as well as diminish their image in the eyes of non-beneficiaries 
(men). In particular, compared to women who were selected purely on the basis of performance, 
women selected as a result of affirmative action evaluated their own leadership abilities more 
poorly (Heilman, Lucas, & Kaplow, 1990), chose to perform less demanding tasks (Heilman, 
                                                          
2 In this context, a “high-status group” is understood to be a group that is characterized by greater prestige, higher 
earnings, or higher career level.  
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Rivero, & Brett, 1991), assumed that others would disregard their competence (Heilman & 
Alcott, 2001), and were indeed seen as less competent by others (Heilman, Block, & Lucas, 
1992). It is important to note, however, that no such detrimental effects were shown when it was 
clear that performance is one of the criteria used in affirmative action decisions, suggesting that 
negative effects of affirmative action are heavily dependent on the assumption that merit plays 
no role in these decisions (Heilman, Block, Martell, & Simon, 1989; Unzueta, Gutiérrez, & 
Ghavami, 2010). Furthermore, recent research revealed that affirmative action receives lower 
acceptance if one can directly identify individuals disadvantaged by the measure (Ritov & Zamir, 
2014). Research carried out outside laboratory settings reports contradictory results. Specifically, 
while some studies do not reveal any detrimental consequences of affirmative action on 
interpersonal and self-perceptions (e.g., Plous, 1996; Taylor, 1994), it has also been found that 
female managers who believed they were selected because of their sex, reported lower job 
commitment and satisfaction (Chacko, 1982). 
 Findings concerning behavioral reactions are partially inconsistent as well. Nacoste 
(1990, 1996; Nacoste & Hummels, 1994) proposed that policies that are implemented in ways 
considered to be unfair are likely to have negative effects on social interactions, such as the 
willingness of individuals to interact with other members of their group. Two recent studies 
provide relevant, but contradictory evidence for this proposition. Balafoutas and Sutter (2012) 
focused on how affirmative action affected coordination and productivity in groups of women 
who were promoted and men who became worse off as a result of the preferential treatment 
given to women. These authors found an increase in team productivity under a quota rule as 
compared to a treatment in which promotion was based on performance. However, the question 
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remains as to how a quota rule affects the cooperation of the group that is newly created as a 
result of a quota-based promotion procedure. 
 Mollerstrom (2012) addressed this question by examining behavior in a high-status group 
composed of members who were selected according to their prior performance and members 
chosen on the basis of a quota rule. Contrary to the results of Balafoutas and Sutter (2010), 
cooperation in this newly formed group was lower if some of the members were selected on the 
basis of a quota rule, compared to a condition in which all members were selected according to 
their performance on a prior task. However, this study used artificially created categories based 
on a minimal group paradigm (Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; see also Brewer, 1993) 
instead of a natural social category with a history of disadvantage, such as gender or race. 
Specifically, in Mollerstrom’s (2012) study, groups were randomly created and designated by 
color names, such as ‘orange’ and ‘purple’. Although these studies differ in other ways as well, it 
is possible that this difference—applying quotas to minimal groups or to groups with greater 
personal and historical significance—might explain the divergence in findings between 
Balafoutas and Sutter (2010), on the one hand, and Mollerstrom (2012), on the other. Indeed, it is 
possible that quotas are better received when the category based on which some individuals 
receive preferential treatment is historically disadvantaged in the context where quotas are 
applied, such as women in boardrooms. To examine this possibility directly, we compare 
responses to the implementation of gender quotas with responses to quotas implemented in 
minimal groups. 
1.2. Quota rules, procedural fairness, and meritocracy 
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Objections to affirmative action can derive from both distributive and procedural fairness 
considerations3 (Nacoste, 1996). However, affirmative action policies have been found to be 
perceived mainly in relation to procedural fairness (Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001). According 
to Nacoste (1996) what drives people’s procedural fairness perception of affirmative action is the 
weight the procedure gives to the “contribution-related” (i.e. education) versus “noncontribution-
related” features (i.e. gender). Consequently, procedural fairness considerations are also likely to 
drive responses to quota rules.  
According to the group engagement model (Tyler & Blader, 2000, 2003), group members 
pay close attention to procedural fairness within their group. Group members derive motivation 
to favor their group or not, depending on these procedural fairness judgments (De Cremer, Tyler, 
& den Ouden, 2005; Blader & Tyler, 2009). Since procedural fairness affects the group 
members’ willingness to cooperate with fellow group members, or work on behalf of the group, 
we expect that cooperation might be reduced after the implementation of a quota rule due to its 
negative effect on perceived procedural fairness. 
Quota-based selection procedures that do not explicitly take into account individual 
performance are likely to be perceived as unfair due to widespread beliefs in meritocracy. 
Meritocracy beliefs constitute the conviction that unequal economic status is and should be 
earned by individual merit alone (e.g., Kluegel & Smith, 1986). These beliefs, even when 
erroneous, are dominant in Western societies, partly because they fulfil a fundamental need to 
believe that the world is a just and fair place (Lerner, 1980). Hence, they are the default for 
                                                          
3 Procedural fairness refers to the evaluation of the fairness of processes through which the outcomes are achieved. 
The following criteria are usually named as relevant for perceptions of procedural fairness: Neutrality (unbiased, 
honest decisions), status recognition (treatment with politeness, dignity, respect), and trustworthiness (decision 
makers concern for the needs of others) (see Tyler, Degoey, & Smith, 1996). 
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perceiving the world (e.g., Barreto & Ellemers, 2015). Therefore, although quota systems aim to 
correct for the absence of meritocratic treatment (just like other forms of affirmative action), 
given the default belief in meritocracy, they are likely to be regarded as unfair, particularly when 
they are applied explicitly, irrespective of individual performance. Furthermore, it has been 
found that individuals have the tendency to defend the current system (i.e. system justification, 
Jost & Banaji, 1994). This tendency might be manifested in meritocratic ideology (Jost, Pelham, 
Sheldon, & Sullivan, 2003). 
 If beliefs in meritocracy constitute the main process governing perceptions of quota rules, 
then we should expect individuals to oppose quota systems, irrespective of whether these refer to 
gender or to any other group, such as a randomly created artificial group. Nevertheless, it is 
possible that additional processes play a role in responses to quota systems. Such processes may 
indeed lead to different reactions, depending on whether quotas are based on gender or on 
artificially created (or socially meaningless) categories. For example, research on categorization 
threat (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999) has shown that individuals resent 
imposed categorical treatment, even when it affords them with an advantage (Barreto, Ellemers, 
Scholten, & Smith, 2010). Indeed, categorical treatment that is seen as contextually inappropriate 
leads to lower identification and less cooperation with the group in which one is being externally 
categorized (Barreto & Ellemers, 2003). Although this can happen with any group membership, 
responses are likely to be stronger when the imposed categorical treatment refers to a social 
category that has meaning outside of the experimental context, especially when it tends to be 
more chronically disadvantaged. A similar argument is made in the literature on responses to 
discrimination. In this case, group-based treatment (discrimination) is found to have more 
negative effects when it pertains to social groups that are frequently discriminated against (e.g., 
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women) than to social groups that are rarely discriminated against (e.g., men; Schmitt & 
Branscombe, 2002).  
 In sum, the available evidence does not allow us to draw firm predictions regarding 
potential effects of categorization type (gender versus an artificially created category) on 
responses to quota systems. However, comparing responses to quota systems based on gender 
with responses to quota systems based on an artificially created category allows us to examine 
more closely whether reactions towards quota systems are driven merely by beliefs in the 
importance of merit, or also by the broader social significance of such preferential treatment and, 
if so, exactly how they shape behavior.   
1.3. Hypotheses 
 The present research focuses on the effects of quota systems on group cooperation, 
specifically on cooperation within the high-status group into which the quota or performance 
allows entry. As such, we restrict our hypotheses to the incumbent and new members of the high-
status group.  
H1: The members of the high-status group are expected to show reduced group cooperation after 
a promotion based purely on quota, as compared to a promotion based purely on performance.  
H2a: Members of a high-status group are expected to perceive promotion based purely on quota 
as less fair than promotion based purely on previous performance.  
H2b: The reduction of group cooperation is expected to be mediated by fairness perceptions.  
We also examine whether the effects of quotas on fairness perceptions and group 
cooperation differ depending on whether quotas are based on gender or on experimentally 
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created categories. In light of previous research, both outcomes are possible. We therefore 
decided to specify the null hypothesis for the interaction between categorization criterion (gender 
or experimentally created category) and promotion procedure (quota- or performance-based) and 
neutrally test whether it must be rejected or not. 
H3: Quota rules are expected to lead to less cooperation and be perceived as less fair 
than performance-based promotion, irrespective of whether quotas are based on gender or on 
artificially created categories. 
2. Experiment 1 
With Experiment 1 we investigated the effects of two different promotion rules: 
Promotion based on categorization criterion (quota rule) or previous performance in a real-effort 
task (performance rule). We additionally manipulated the categorization criterion by introducing 
categorization based on gender or on experimentally created category (i.e. color assignment). We 
assessed group cooperation before and after the promotion rule was applied. Additionally, we 
examined fairness perception of the different procedures.  
2.1. Materials and methods 
 
2.1.1.  Design and participants  
 Participants were randomly assigned to the four conditions of a 2(categorization criterion: 
gender vs. artificial category) x 2(promotion rule: performance vs. quota) between-participants 
factorial design. One hundred eighty-eight participants, mostly students at the University of 
Bonn (age: M = 24.74, SD = 6.5; 50% female) with heterogeneous fields of study, were recruited 
from the MPI Decision Lab subject pool via the online recruitment tool ORSEE (Greiner, 2004, 
2015). Participants interacted with each other in groups of four, and usually 12 individuals took 
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part in each of the 19 experimental sessions. Due to occasional no-shows, only eight participants 
(two groups) took part in some sessions, resulting in valid data from 11 to 13 groups per 
condition. Each session lasted about 70 minutes. In all four conditions, participants performed an 
incentivized slider task. Participants’ total payments ranged from 3.70 to 22.50 Euros (approx. 
USD 4.17 to 27.65).4 The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).  
2.1.2.  Materials and procedure 
 Upon arriving at the laboratory, participants were randomly assigned to separate cubicles. 
They were instructed that communication between participants was forbidden throughout the 
experiment and that the experiment consisted of two parts. First, instructions describing the rules 
of the first part were distributed (on paper).5 After participants had answered three control 
questions, their answers were checked by the experimenters. In case of at least one incorrect 
answer, participants were asked to reread the instructions and to try again. Afterwards, 
participants filled out a demographic questionnaire. Next, they were assigned to groups of four. 
In the gender conditions (gender performance and gender quota) each group consisted of one 
randomly drawn female and three randomly drawn male participants. In the color conditions 
(color performance and color quota), participants were first randomly assigned a color (orange or 
green) and next randomly divided into groups of four (three orange and one green participant in 
each group). Afterwards, each group of four was split into two-person subgroups (high-status 
and low-status subgroups), in which participants performed the first part of the experiment. This 
means that half of the participants started in a privileged high-status group. The remaining half of 
                                                          
4 In addition to the performance contingent reward (M = 10.90 €, approx. USD 12.29), participants received 1 € 
(approx. USD 1.13) fixed payment for an online Social Dominance Orientation questionnaire they filled out at least 
12 hours before coming to the laboratory. 
5 The experimental instructions as well as all other files (data, experimental program, analyses) can be retrieved 
from https://osf.io/t4fgu/ 
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the participants started in a low-status group. The differences in status were introduced through 
an exchange rate of points earned in the experimental task. Each point obtained by a member of a 
high-status group was worth 16 cents, whereas members of a low-status group received 8 cents 
for each point. Thus, members of low-status groups were discriminated against with regard to 
wage for performing exactly the same task as members of the high-status groups.   
 The high-status group consisted of two male (two orange) participants and the low-status 
group consisted of one male (one orange) and one female (one green) participant. The male 
(orange) participants had a chance of 2/3 of being assigned to the high-status group, whereas the 
female (green) participants were always assigned to the low-status group. Thus, female (green) 
participants had no chance of being initially assigned to the high-status group. This way in the 
gender condition females were discriminated against (all were placed in the low status group). In 
the artificial category conditions, two color groups were created (green and orange) and 
participants randomly categorized as ‘green’ were discriminated against (all were placed in the 
low-status group). In the color conditions, participants were provided with information on the 
color they were assigned to and the color of the other subgroup member. In the gender 
conditions, participants were provided with information on the gender of the other subgroup 
member. 
 In the experiment, participants completed a slider task (Gill & Prowse, 2012, 2013). 
Participants were presented with 48 sliders on the screen. Each slider ranged from 0 to 100. 
Participants were instructed that their task was to adjust sliders from the initial position at 0 to 
the value of 50. They had 120 seconds for this task and could move the slider bar by clicking on 
the sides of the bar or by dragging the slider along the bar, which moved the slider by increments 
of 1. Since previous research has found systematic differences between hypothetical and real 
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social interactions (e.g. Vlaev, 2012), we fully incentivized the slider task to enhance external 
validity: For each correctly solved slider (that is, for each slider that was placed exactly at the 
value of 50) participants earned one point. The slider task has one additional advantage: Previous 
studies did not observe gender differences in individual performance on this task (Gill & Prowse, 
2013; Gerhards & Siemer, 2014; Lindner, 2014). This feature is important to our research since 
we aimed at implementing a gender-neutral task.  
 The first part of the experiment included three phases in which the slider task was 
completed, that is a practice trial, and two phases that were relevant for payment: One with the 
individual and one with the group payment scheme (in randomized order). After each phase, 
participants received feedback concerning the number of sliders solved. In the individual 
scheme, payment depended solely on individual performance. Thus, it served as a benchmark for 
individual skills and learning. In the group scheme, the number of sliders solved by the two 
members of a subgroup were summed up, multiplied by 1.2, and divided evenly between the 
subgroup members. We implemented this multiplier to reflect additional benefits obtained 
through group work. Hence, both members of each subgroup (i.e., high-status or low-status 
group) could additionally profit from their contribution. After completing the slider task in both 
payment phases, participants received feedback about their payoffs (in the individual payment 
phase, in the group payment phase, and total payoff). 
 As soon as the first part was over, the instructions for the second part were distributed. 
Participants read that one of the low-status subgroup participants would now switch to the high-
status subgroup and replace a randomly chosen high-status subgroup participant, who in turn 
would switch to the low-status subgroup, in order to keep the group size constant. This way a 
possibility of being promoted from the low-status to the high-status group was introduced. The 
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promotion rule varied depending on the experimental condition. In the performance-based 
condition, the low-status subgroup member who switched to the high-status subgroup was 
chosen on the basis of the average number of sliders solved in the preceding individual and 
group payment phases. The participant with more sliders solved was promoted to the high-status 
subgroup (a random draw was conducted in case of a tie), irrespective of his/her color or gender. 
In the quota conditions, a female (green) participant was chosen to be promoted to the high-
status subgroup. In this case, performance in the first part of the experiment was irrelevant for 
the promotion. After reading the second part of the instructions and answering a control question 
regarding the promotion procedure,6 participants were informed (on the screen) about whether 
they would switch to the other subgroup or remain in their initial subgroup. They were also 
reminded of what constituted the basis for promotion (performance, gender, or color). Although 
participants who stayed in the high-status subgroup were well aware of what promotion rule had 
been used to recruit the new member, they were not informed about the exact performance of 
their new subgroup member. The new subgroup members were also not informed about the exact 
performance of the incumbent subgroup member. Next, as in the first part of the experiment, 
participants solved the slider task once with the individual and once with the group payment 
scheme (again, the order was randomly determined). The payment for each point obtained in the 
slider tasks followed the same rule as in the first part—high-status group members received 16 
cents per point, while low-status group members received 8 cents per point. At the end of the 
second part, participants received information about their payoffs in this part of the experiment 
(again separately for individual and group payment scheme, and total payoff). Afterwards, 
                                                          
6 The control question was a multiple choice question. Irrespective of the condition, there was always one option 
describing the quota-based promotion procedure and one option describing the performance-based promotion 
procedure. In this way, participants were made aware of other possible promotion procedures. 
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participants filled out a questionnaire in which they were explicitly asked about the extent to 
which they perceived the promotion procedure as fair. To assess perceived fairness of the 
promotion procedure, we included a questionnaire based on Tyler and Blader (2000). The 
questionnaire included items such as “The rules and procedures were equally fair to everyone”, 
“The participants were treated with dignity”, “How fair was the outcome of the promotion 
procedure?” Questions were answered on seven-point Likert-type scales, with higher scores 
representing perceptions of the procedure as fairer.7 The resulting questionnaire consisted of a 
scale measuring the formal quality of decision-making (four items; Cronbach’s alpha = 0.76) and 
another scale measuring the formal quality of treatment (three items; Cronbach’s alpha = 0.84). 
Furthermore, we included a scale on distributive fairness in order to control for potential 
differences in distributive justice perceptions (two items; Cronbach’s alpha = 0.81).8  
 Finally, participants were informed about their total payments in both parts of the 
experiment and asked to enter individually a separate room, where they received their payments 
in private.  
2.2.Results 
 Since our hypotheses refer to the behavior of the members of the high-status group, the 
analyses focus on the responses of a subgroup of participants consisting of an incumbent member 
of the high-status group and a new member originally stemming from the low-status group. 
                                                          
7 In the experiment, participants answered the fairness questionnaire with an inverted scale where 1 indicated the 
fairest and 7 the most unfair judgment. For the sake of a more intuitive understanding of the results, we inverted the 
scale in all analyses. 
8 We additionally examined whether responses to quota systems based on gender or on artificially created groups are 
affected by chronic tendencies to endorse, desire, and support social hierarchies, that is, social dominance 
orientation (Sidanius & Pratto, 2001). The analyses revealed no significant effects of this measure. For details of 
these analyses, please contact the lead authors.  
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Therefore, the total number of participants whose responses are relevant to our hypotheses is half 
(N = 94) of the total number of participants who took part in Experiment 1 (N = 188).  
2.2.1. Performance and cooperation 
 Two participants solved no slider during the entire experiment and one participant solved 
no slider only in the first part of the experiment, which most probably is a result of a 
misunderstanding of the task. These participants were excluded from all following analyses. 
Thus, the total number of participants entering the analysis is 91.9 Averaged across all parts and 
conditions of Experiment 1, participants solved a total of 87.9 (SD = 19.3) sliders (excluding 
practice trial), which amounts to the average of 21.9 (SD = 4.8) sliders per phase. In the color 
conditions, the difference between the average number of sliders solved by male and female 
participants was not statistically significant (men: M = 22.9, SD = 5.4; women: M = 21.54, SD = 
3.97; Mann-Whitney test: z = 1.31, p = .18), confirming the gender neutrality of the task. In the 
gender conditions, however, female participants solved on average fewer sliders than male 
participants (men: M = 23.11, SD = 4.96; women: M = 19.60, SD = 5.47; Mann-Whitney test: z = 
2.13, p =.03). In line with research on the effects of disadvantage on performance (e.g., Barreto, 
2014 for a review), this difference is likely to reflect the negative motivational effects of the 
gender disadvantage induced at the start of the study.  
 Our set of hypotheses concerns the effects of quota on cooperation in the second part of 
the experiment (i.e., after promotion). According to the definition of cooperation adopted in this 
article, we assumed that the goal of the group in the experiment is to maximize the sum of the 
number of sliders solved by the two members of the group. Given this goal, a cooperative act of 
                                                          
9 Including these participants in the sample does not change the pattern of the results. 
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each member would be to solve as many sliders as possible in the group payment scheme. The 
number of sliders solved in the individual payment scheme was regarded as a benchmark for the 
maximum number of sliders one is able to solve within 120 seconds. Thus, the participants’ 
willingness to cooperate was operationalized as the difference in number of sliders solved in the 
group payment scheme and number of sliders solved according to the individual payment 
scheme. This difference is referred to in the following as the ‘cooperation score’. A negative 
cooperation score indicates free-riding, whereas a positive cooperation score implies 
cooperation. The cooperation score controls for any heterogeneity in skills and learning, since 
performance in the individual payment scheme is included in its calculation. To test our 
hypotheses, we focused on a change in cooperation scores between the first and second part of 
the experiment (before and after promotion). The cooperation score in the first part of the 
experiment was subtracted from the cooperation score in the second part. Positive values indicate 
either an increase in cooperation or a decrease in free-riding, whereas negative numbers indicate 
a decrease in cooperation or an increase in free-riding. Individual average cooperation scores for 
all experimental conditions are displayed in Table 1.  
[Insert Table 1] 
 Figure 1 displays the results concerning group means of the change in cooperation scores 
by experimental conditions.    
[Insert Figure 1] 
We conducted an OLS regression analysis, predicting this change in the cooperation 
score by promotion rule (variable quota coded 0 = performance, 1 = quota), categorization 
criterion (variable color coded 0 = gender, 1 = color), and their interaction (variables centered). 
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To control for interdependencies between participants, we used a cluster correction for standard 
errors at the group level. Additionally, a task order indicator was included as a control variable to 
account for general learning effects over time. The results of the analysis are displayed in Table 
2 (Model 1).  
[Insert Table 2] 
In line with hypothesis 1, we found a marginally significant difference in the change of 
cooperation score between performance-based as compared to quota-based promotion, b = -1.68, 
t(43) = -1.87, p = .07. Although not statistically significant10, cooperation tended to increase in 
the performance condition (positive change in cooperation score) but tended to decrease in the 
quota condition (negative change in cooperation score) as can be seen from the column means in 
Table 1. Jointly, these two tendencies resulted in the overall marginally significant impact of the 
promotion procedure on the change in cooperation score.  
Neither the main effect of categorization criterion (color vs. gender), b = 0.61, t(43) = 0.69, p = 
.50, nor the interaction reached conventional significance levels, b = 2.18, t(43) = 1.22, p = .23. 
Simple effects revealed that the change in cooperation score differs significantly between quota-
based and performance-based promotion in the gender conditions, F(1, 46) = 6.94, p = .02, but 
not in the color conditions, F(1, 46) = 0.22, p = .64. 
2.2.2. Perceived fairness 
                                                          
10 Using a Wilcoxon signed rank test we compared the group means of the change in cooperation score against zero 
separately for the quota and the performance conditions. None of the tests reached conventional level of statistical 
significance (all z < 1.73 all p-values > .08). 
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  In order to test our hypotheses 2a and 2b, we conducted an OLS regression predicting 
perceived procedural fairness by promotion rule (quota vs. performance), categorization criterion 
(color vs. gender), and their interaction (variables centered).  
[Insert Table 3] 
 Results are displayed in Figure 2 and summarized in Table 3 (Model 1). We observed no 
main effect of a quota rule, as compared to a performance rule, b = -0.14, t(88) =-.52, p = .60. 
Hence, the results provide no support for hypothesis 2a assuming higher perceived fairness for 
performance-based promotion. Promotion rules were perceived as more fair when categorization 
was based on an artificially created group than when it was based on gender, b = 0.92, t(88) = 
3.38, p = .001. We additionally observed an unexpected interaction between promotion rule and 
categorization/discrimination criterion, b = 1.16, t(88) = 2.14, p = .04. Hence, the null hypothesis 
3 assuming no influence of categorization criterion was rejected. Simple effects revealed that 
quota rules were perceived as less fair (albeit marginally significant) than performance-based 
promotion in the gender conditions, F(1, 87) = 3.54, p = .06, but not in the color conditions, F(1, 
87) = 1.22, p = .27.  
[Insert Figure 2] 
 In sum, although the quotas imposed in this study did not comply with meritocracy 
principles, irrespective of the categorization criterion, they were only seen as less fair than 
performance-based promotion when the categorization was based on gender rather than on an 
artificially created category.  
According to hypothesis 2b, the effect of the promotion rule on cooperation should be 
mediated by fairness perceptions. However, the distinct patterns of findings for these two 
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measures suggest that this is not the case. Indeed, an OLS regression predicting a change in 
cooperation score with fairness perceptions as an independent variable and task order indicator 
as a control variable did not reveal a significant effect, b = 0.171, t(44) = 0.67, p = .51. Similar 
results were obtained when conducting the same OLS regression separately for conditions in that 
the procedure was found to be comparatively unfair (i.e. the gender conditions). The influence of 
fairness perception on a change in the cooperation score was far from significant (p > .43) in 
both conditions. Thus, the necessary conditions for mediation analysis have not been met (Baron 
& Kenny, 1986). Hence, hypothesis 2b was not supported by our data. The observed effect of 
promotion rules on group cooperation was not mediated by fairness perceptions.  
2.3. Discussion 
With Experiment 1, we systematically investigated the effects of one of the measures 
aimed at reducing gender inequality in the workplace—gender quotas—on team cooperation. 
One of the positive effects argued by proposers of gender quotas is their potential to improve 
team performance. Our results suggest that this idea is misguided in contexts where team 
performance is reliant on cooperation measured by people’s individual actions to promote the 
goals of the group, at least when no further information is provided that justifies the use of 
quotas.  
We found some potential side effects of quota rules at the behavioral level. Our findings 
showed that the participants’ willingness to exert effort on behalf of the group (a willingness 
either to free-ride less or to cooperate more) is negatively influenced at the marginally significant 
level by promotion based on a quota rule, as compared to performance-based promotion.  
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Quota-based promotion was perceived as less fair than promotion based on performance 
only when the quota procedure was based on gender, and not when it was based on an 
experimentally created category. That is, our participants perceived a preferential treatment 
based on an experimentally created group (that had initially been disadvantaged) as equally fair 
as a performance-based rule. Contrary to our hypothesis, the effect of quota on cooperation was 
not mediated by fairness perceptions.  
Although we did our best to develop an adequate experimental paradigm to test our 
hypotheses, critical inspection of our design reveals some potential limitations. First, as the 
analyses are limited to the high-status group members, the number of participants that entered 
the analyses is only half of the full sample size of N = 188. This allows us to detect group 
differences of a medium size with a power of 1 - β = .67 (d = .50, α = .05, two-tailed test; Faul et 
al., 2009). Therefore, a replication with a larger sample size would clearly be desirable to gain 
more certainty about the effects. Besides, the composition of men and women was different in 
the color conditions as compared to the gender conditions. Whereas nine male and three female 
participants took part in an experimental session of the gender conditions (or six male and two 
female participants in case of no-shows), women were oversampled in the color conditions. 
Therefore, we cannot rule out that the observed differences between color and gender conditions 
were at least partially a result of the different gender compositions in the experimental 
conditions. For example, men and women might differ in their reactions to the implemented 
promotion rules or the number of male and female participants in one experimental session might 
influence individuals’ behavior.  
Another potential limitation of Experiment 1 is that we did not assess expectations 
regarding the performance of the new group member promoted based on performance or quota 
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rule. In the quota conditions, participants did not receive any information regarding individual 
performance. Given a very low marginal cost of solving one slider, maximal performance should 
be rational in all cases. Therefore, from a classic rational-choice perspective, expectations are 
unlikely to be the sole explanation for the observed results. However, we cannot completely 
exclude the possibility that the incumbent person might have lower expectations regarding the 
number of sliders that the incoming person promoted by quota is able to solve (Heilman et al., 
1992). Low expectations could lead the incumbent person to adjust her performance accordingly 
by solving fewer sliders in the group-payment phase.  
Finally, although we found the hypothesized negative impact of quota rules on 
cooperation, we could not confirm the hypothesized mediation, that is, fairness perceptions of the 
promotion procedure did not predict change in cooperation. This might reflect the nature of the 
process, but it might also reflect the specific design features of this research. Some participants 
pointed out that it was not entirely clear from which point of view to judge procedural fairness 
since the promotion rule affected not only the person who was promoted, but also the person 
who had to leave the high-status group. Furthermore, although we told participants to focus on 
the promotion stage when filling out the fairness questionnaire, some participants might have 
read over this information as it was provided along with the remaining parts of the instructions. 
Thus, it is possible that people evaluated different aspects of the procedure when answering the 
fairness questionnaire.  
3. Experiment 2 
With Experiment 2, we aimed to replicate the effect of promotion rule on group 
cooperation as found in Experiment 1. Experiment 2 was conducted to address the above-
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mentioned issues by ensuring equal gender composition in the gender and color conditions, 
increasing the sample size, and adding further questions to shed light on participants’ perceptions 
of the situation.   
3.1. Materials and methods 
 
3.1.1. Design and participants  
 As in Experiment 1, participants were randomly assigned to the four conditions of a 
2(categorization criterion: gender vs. artificial category) x 2(promotion rule: performance vs. 
quota) between-participants factorial design. Two hundred sixty-eight participants (age: M = 
22.2, SD = 5.4, 26.5% female) were recruited in the same manner as in Experiment 1. Differently 
from our first experiment however, we kept the proportion of male and female participants about 
equal in all experimental conditions. Twelve or sometimes eight individuals took part in each of 
the 27 experimental sessions. Each session lasted about 70 minutes. Participants’ total payments 
ranged from 3.80 to 26.30 Euros (approx. USD 4.28 to 29.65).11 
3.2. Materials and procedure 
The first two parts of Experiment 2 followed exactly the same procedure as in 
Experiment 1. We introduced two changes at the end of Experiment 2. First, we asked the 
incumbent participants of the high-status group about their expectations regarding task 
performance of the incoming group member. The estimation task took place in the second part of 
the experiment after participants conducted the slider task in both payment schemes. It was 
introduced before the information about payoffs was displayed, since this information would 
                                                          
11 To ensure comparability with our first study, participants again filled out an online Social Dominance Orientation 
questionnaire before coming to the laboratory for which they received a fixed amount of 1 € (approx. USD 1.13) in 
addition to the performance contingent reward (M = 11.80 €, approx. USD 13.30). 
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have revealed the incoming group member’s performance in the group payment scheme. 
Participants had to indicate their estimate of the average number of sliders solved by the 
promoted group member in the preceding individual and group payment phases in the second 
part of the experiment.12 For each correct estimate participants received an additional payment of 
1 € (approx. USD 1.13).  
Second, after the second part of the experiment participants filled out the fairness 
questionnaire that we used in Experiment 1. To make sure that participants’ evaluation target 
was clear, participants answered the fairness questionnaire three times: (1) with regard to the 
overall procedure implemented to the group change, (2) with regard to the procedure 
implemented to the group member promoted from the low-status to the high-status group, and 
(3) with regard to the procedure implemented to the group member switching from the high-
status to the low-status group.13 Before each questionnaire participants were presented on a 
separate screen with a statement clarifying which procedure and group member should be 
evaluated in the following questions. In order to proceed to the questions, participants had to 
press an “OK” button.  
3.3. Results 
                                                          
12 To keep the design equal for all participants, all of them stated their expectations about all other members of the 
initial 4-person group. For example, the person who stayed in the high-status group gave an estimate for the person 
who was promoted to the high-status group, the person who switched to the low-status group, and the person who 
stayed in the low-status group. 
13 All scales showed reasonable reliability in our sample: basic questionnaire: formal quality of decision-making: 
Cronbach’s alpha = 0.71, formal quality of treatment: Cronbach’s alpha = 0.86, distributive fairness: Cronbach’s 
alpha = 0.74. Questionnaire for person who switched to the high-status group: formal quality of decision-making: 
Cronbach’s alpha = 0.76, formal quality of treatment: Cronbach’s alpha = 0.88, distributive fairness: Cronbach’s 
alpha = 0.75. Questionnaire for person who switched to the low-status group: formal quality of decision-making: 
Cronbach’s alpha = 0.76, formal quality of treatment: Cronbach’s alpha = 0.88, distributive fairness: Cronbach’s 
alpha = 0.71. 
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In Experiment 2, as in Experiment 1, we focused in the analyses on participants who were 
either promoted to the high-status group or stayed in the high-status group after the first part of the 
experiment. Therefore, the total number of participants whose responses were analyzed is N = 134 
and constitutes half of the total number of participants who took part in Experiment 2 (N = 268).  
3.3.1. Performance and cooperation 
One person did not solve any slider during the whole experiment. Therefore, the ultimate 
number of participants entering the analyses is 133. In Experiment 2, participants solved on 
average 91.5 (SD = 21.3) sliders in both parts of the experiment in total, which amounts to the 
average of 22.9 (SD = 5.3) per phase (excluding practice trial). As in Experiment 1, there was no 
difference in the average number of sliders solved by men and women in the color conditions 
(men: M = 23.01, SD = 5.0; women: M = 22.03, SD = 4.98; Mann-Whitney test: z = 0.49, p = 
.62) again supporting the gender neutrality of the task. Also similarly to Experiment 1, in the 
gender conditions male participants solved on average more sliders than female participants 
(men: M = 24.27, SD = 5.4; women: M = 19.56, SD = 4.75; Mann-Whitney test: z = 3.96, p < 
.001), which might be a result of the gender disadvantage introduced at the beginning of the 
study.  
Participants’ willingness to cooperate was operationalized, as in Experiment 1, by 
calculating the ‘cooperation score’ for each participant. This was used to calculate a change in 
cooperation scores as our core dependent measure. Average change in cooperation scores for all 
experimental conditions in Experiment 2 are given in Table 4.  
[Insert Table 4] 
SIDE EFFECTS OF QUOTA RULES  
26 
 
Figure 3 displays the results concerning the group means of change in the cooperation 
scores.  
[Insert Figure 3] 
Model 2 in Table 2 presents the results of an OLS regression analysis including the same 
variables as for the analysis of the Experiment 1 (see Model 1). Again, the change in cooperation 
score was predicted by promotion rule, categorization criterion, and their interaction. We 
included the task order indicator and clustered the standard errors at the group level.  
In line with Experiment 1, we found a marginally significant difference in the change of 
cooperation score between performance-based as compared to quota-based promotion, b = -1.56, 
t(63) = -1.86, p = .07. As can be seen in Table 4 and similar to Experiment 1, cooperation tended 
to increase in the performance condition but tended to decrease in the quota condition (both 
results not statistically significantly different from zero)14, which jointly results in the overall 
effect of quota-based vs. performance-based promotion. This result is in line with hypothesis 1 
and serves as a replication of Experiment 1. Both the main effect of categorization criterion and 
the interaction were again statistically non-significant.  
As we used exactly the same experimental procedures in Experiments 1 and 2 for the 
different stages of the real-effort task, we conducted an overall analysis to generate best 
estimates concerning the behavioral effects (Model 3). An OLS regression analysis with the 
same specification as above but including the pooled data of Experiment 1 and 2 and an 
                                                          
14 We compared group means of the change in cooperation score against zero using a Wilcoxon signed rank test 
separately for the quota and the performance conditions. The tests revealed statistically nonsignificant results (all z < 
0.98 all p-values > .11). 
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experiment dummy revealed a significant decline in cooperation score comparing performance-
based to quota-based conditions, b = -1.61, t(109) = -2.60, p = .01.15  
3.3.2. Fairness perception  
Figure 4 presents the results of the fairness perception questionnaire. From the left to the 
right it displays: (A) general fairness perception of the procedure implemented after the first part 
of the experiment, (B) fairness perception of the procedure implemented with regard to the 
person switching from the high-status subgroup to the low-status subgroup (degraded 
participant), (C) fairness perception of the procedure implemented with regard to the promoted 
participant.  
[Insert Figure 4] 
Table 3 reports the results of an OLS regression analysis predicting perceived procedural fairness 
from promotion rule, categorization criterion, and their interaction. Model 2, which refers to the 
overall fairness perception, revealed that – in contrast to hypothesis 2a - there was again no main 
effect of the type of promotion procedure (quota vs. performance) on its fairness perception, b = 
.02, t(130) = 0.10, p = .92. Furthermore, we found an unexpected marginally significant impact 
of the categorization criterion on the overall procedural fairness perception. The promotion 
procedure was generally perceived as marginally significantly fairer in the color conditions as 
compared to the gender conditions, b = .45, t(130) = 1.91, p = .06. The unexpected interaction 
                                                          
15 To check whether the negative effect of quota-based vs. performance-based promotion only applies to a specific 
role (incumbent vs. newcomer) we conducted OLS regression analyses for both experiments separately as well as 
for the pooled data predicting the change in cooperation score by promotion rule, categorization criterion, role of the 
high-status group member, and the interaction between role and promotion rule. The effect of promotion rule (quota 
vs. performance) on cooperation score remains unchanged. 
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effect from Experiment 1 was not replicated: There was no interaction between promotion 
procedure and categorization criterion in Experiment 2, b = 0.30, t(130) = 0.64, p = .53.  
Experimental conditions did not affect the perception of the procedure implemented with 
respect to the degraded person (Model 3). Neither the main effects of promotion procedure, b = -
0.01, t(130) = -0.06, p = .96, nor categorization criterion, b = 0.23, t(130) = 0.98, p = .33, nor 
their interaction, b = 0.50, t(130) = 1.04, p = .30, reached conventional statistical levels of 
significance.  
In contrast, as revealed in Model 4, when people judged the procedure with a focus on the 
promoted person, the promotion procedure based on quota was perceived as less fair than 
promotion based on performance, b = -0.74, t(130) = -3.42, p = .001. Hence, some support for 
hypothesis 2a is found, when individuals focus not on the overall procedure but on the promoted 
person only. Also, similarly to fairness perception of the overall procedure, the procedure 
implemented with respect to the promoted person was perceived by participants in the color 
conditions as fairer than in the gender conditions, b = .47, t(130) = 2.17, p = .03. The interaction 
term was not significant.  
Further analyses revealed that again, for each target of evaluation perceived fairness did not 
predict the change in cooperation score (p > .59), providing no support for hypothesis 2b. The 
same result was obtained with pooled data (Experiment 1 and 2) conducting an OLS regression 
(standard errors clustered at the group level) on change in cooperation score and including the 
overall perceived fairness as a predictor variable and task order indicator as a control variable, b 
= 0.13, t(111) = 0.65, p = .52. Thus, the necessary conditions for mediation analysis have again 
not been met (Baron & Kenny, 1986). Further exploration of a potential relation between 
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procedural fairness and the change in cooperation score (an OLS regression analysis with the 
same specification as above but including also promotion rule, categorization criterion and their 
interaction) led to the same pattern of results.16 
With a subdivided fairness questionnaire, we were furthermore able to explore another 
potential explaining factor in our study: One might argue that the downgrading and replacement 
of the former group member is perceived as unfair by the incumbent group members, especially 
in quota-based promotion conditions when the upgrading violates the principles of meritocracy. 
In this case the negative effect of quota-based as compared to performance-based promotion on 
the change in cooperation of incumbent group members could be partially or entirely driven by 
the boycotting behavior resulting from unfair treatment of the downgraded member. However, 
our results do not reveal any differences between conditions regarding incumbent members’ 
perception of the procedure applied to the downgraded former group member [4.29 (1.41), 4.34 
(1.68), Mann-Whitney test: z = -0.231, p = .82]. Furthermore, to test whether fairness perceptions 
of the downgrading procedure predict the change in cooperation score for incumbent members, 
we conducted an OLS regression analysis on the change in cooperation score including 
perceived fairness of the downgrading procedure as a predictor variable and task order indicator 
as a control variable. The results revealed a negative, but not significant effect, b = -.26, t(63) = -
0.62, p = .54.17 
                                                          
16 The effect of procedural fairness perception on the change in cooperation score was again not significant, b = .14, 
t(108) = 0.66, p = .51. Also, the main effect of promotion rule on the change in cooperation score remained the 
same, b = - 1.61, t(108) = -2.60, p = .01, as in an OLS regression analysis without procedural fairness as a predictor 
variable (see p. 27).  
17 A similar result was obtained when including the promotion rule, categorization criterion and their interaction in 
the OLS regression analysis. The relation between perceived fairness of the downgrading procedure and the change 
in cooperation score remained negative, but not significant, b= -0.28, t(60) = -0.65, p = .52. 
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3.3.3. Expectations about performance 
To test whether differences in expectations about the newcomer`s performance explain 
the difference in the change of cooperation between conditions, we assessed participants’ 
expectations after the last stage of the slider task and before payoff information.18 The results of 
an OLS regression analysis including as explanatory variables promotion rule (quota vs. 
performance), categorization criterion (color vs. gender), and their interaction, revealed that 
incumbent members did not have significantly lower expectations regarding the performance of 
the newcomer when this person was promoted based on a quota as compared to performance, b =  
-.50, t(62) = -0.32, p = .75. Additionally, we conducted an OLS regression on the change in 
cooperation score of incumbent high-status group members including expectations about 
performance of the incoming member as a predictor and a task order indicator as a control 
variable. Expectations also did not predict the change in cooperation score of incumbent 
members, b = 0.16, t(63) = 1.57, p = .12. Further analysis including additionally promotion rule, 
categorization criterion and their interaction into the above specified OLS regression revealed a 
positive, but non-significant relation between expectations and the change in cooperation score, 
b=0.17, t(60) = 1.60, p = .12. 
3.4. Discussion 
With Experiment 2 we aimed at replicating behavioral side effects of quota rules on 
group cooperation. Again, we found that individuals responded to a quota measure with a 
                                                          
18 In total, 16 out of 66 incumbent members made at least one correct estimation of previous performance of the 
promoted group member.  
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(marginally significant) decline in cooperation compared to performance-based promotion, 
irrespective of the categorization criterion, supporting hypothesis 1.  
In contrast to Experiment 1, the only difference in overall fairness perceptions was found 
between color and gender conditions in that promotion in color conditions was in general 
perceived as being fairer than promotion in gender conditions. The subdivision of the 
questionnaire into two further fairness assessments allowed for a more fine-grained analysis of 
fairness perceptions. We found that when people judged the procedure with a focus on the 
promoted person, the promotion procedure based on quota was perceived as less fair than 
promotion based on performance, in line with hypothesis 2a. These results might be due to the 
additional statements in the questionnaire clarifying the target of the evaluation. However, such 
interpretations have to be made with caution since the assessment of expectations prior to the 
fairness questionnaire might have also influenced the answers. As in Experiment 1, the observed 
effect of promotion rules on group cooperation was not mediated by fairness perceptions, neither 
for the overall questionnaire, nor for the version with the focus on the promoted member. Hence, 
there was no support for hypothesis 2b. Also, the analysis of the additional questions included in 
Experiment 2 revealed that differences in expectations concerning the performance of the 
promoted persons were not an explaining factor for a decline of the cooperation score.  
4. General discussion 
The participation of men and women in the workforce is still unequal. One measure that 
is increasingly used to introduce a higher representation of women in high-status positions, such 
as company executives or board members, is a mandatory gender quota. Proposers of quotas 
argue that besides increasing the share of women, this legislative tool comes with an additional 
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benefit: It improves team performance. With two experiments, we investigated the effects of 
gender quotas on a specific aspect of team performance, i.e. group cooperation.  
In our experiments we relied on an incentivized, real-effort task. Unlike previous research 
in this area (e.g., Balafoutas & Sutter, 2012), we investigated behavior in groups, the 
composition of which changed either due to a quota- or to a performance-based rule. 
Furthermore, to gain more insight into the mechanism underlying possible reactions to quota 
rules, and different from Mollerstrom (2012), we contrasted a gender-based promotion procedure 
with a system that applied to an experimentally created category with no meaning or existence 
outside of the laboratory (i.e., group color).19 Our results show that, although a quota system 
secures the achievement of a certain share of women in a specific target group, this might go 
along with negative impacts on group cooperation. In both experiments, cooperation behavior 
declined when promotion was based on quota compared to performance-based promotion 
(although the results were only marginally significant when treating Experiment 1 and 2 
separately). This happened irrespective of the categorization type (gender or color) that was used 
as a criterion for a quota-based promotion. The observed difference between conditions seems to 
be a combination of two opposing (although not significant) changes in cooperation scores: 
Whereas people tended to react with an increase in cooperation when promotion was based on 
performance, cooperation tended to decrease in response to quota-based promotion. 
Surprisingly, in both Experiment 1 and 2 the promotion procedures were perceived as 
fairer when implemented with artificially created minimal groups as compared to a socially 
meaningful group, that is gender. One possible explanation for this result is that initial 
                                                          
19 This approach is in line with a social cognition perspective on economic behavior (i.e., Crusius, van Horen, & 
Mussweiler, 2012) aiming at revealing the underlying processes of people’s economic behavior. 
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assignments and later promotion according to color are perceived more globally as a sequence of 
random events that are fair from a procedural perspective. Each person starts with equal rights 
(before the color assignment) and what happens afterwards is merely based on luck and therefore 
fair (i.e., Oberholzer-Gee, Bohnet, & Frey, 1999). In contrast, gender based assignment and 
promotion is based on categories that are clearly perceived to be systematic and might convey a 
message about the skills and abilities of participants. Although fairness perceptions were also 
affected by the promotion rule and categorization criteria implemented in the study, fairness 
evaluation did not influence group cooperation in both experiments. In addition, the expectations 
regarding performance of the promoted group member did not emerge as an underlying factor for 
the observed decline in cooperation when promotion was based on quota. The practical 
implications of our findings would therefore require further consideration of the processes that 
might underlie these effects. It is important to examine not only the effects of specific equality 
and diversity initiatives on relevant outcomes (e.g., group cooperation), but also to investigate 
the driving factors and the precise conditions that are required to avoid negative side effects of 
specific initiatives (such as quota rules).  
  
5. Limitations and future directions 
Although we took great care when designing our experiment, it still contains some 
weaknesses that could be addressed by future research. First, although we find a marginally 
significant decline in cooperation behavior as a response to a quota compared to a performance-
based promotion in Experiment 1, and replicate this effect in Experiment 2, at this point we are 
not able to pin down the precise mechanism that explains this effect. We did not find the 
hypothesized mediation through perceptions of the fairness of the promotion procedure, even 
with an extended fairness questionnaire in Experiment 2. This might have emerged, however, 
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due to procedural choices made for these studies. For instance, a stronger effect might emerge if 
fairness perceptions were assessed directly after promotion and before participants interacted 
with the other member of the high-status group.  
 Second, cooperation in our study tended to increase when promotion was based on 
performance and decrease when it was based on a quota, resulting jointly in a negative impact of 
quota rules on cooperation as compared to performance based promotion. Given the fact that 
performance-based principles for economic status and distributing outcomes are perceived as 
common and fair (e.g. Kluegel & Smith 1986; Son Hing et al. 2011, Arvey & Renz, 1992) a 
comparison of a quota rule to a performance condition seems appropriate. However, also other 
selection criteria, such as selection based on seniority and political connections are practiced 
(Arvey & Renz, 1992). Future research could contrast quota-based promotions to such selection 
procedures and could in addition try to isolate the pure effect of promotion by including a control 
condition with random promotion (promotion based on no rule). 
Third, our study can only speak to reactions towards quota rules when no information is 
given about the performance of the newcomer.20 However, in the majority of real-life cases the 
information on candidates’ qualifications is not provided to the co-workers. Instead, people are 
often uninformed about the involvement of merit in quota rules. Such lack of information might 
result in lower expectations regarding the performance of the incoming person promoted by 
quota (Heilman et al., 1992). Nevertheless, in our experiment, expectations about overall 
performance of persons promoted due to a quota rule as compared to a performance-based 
promotion did not differ and did not affect the decline in cooperation. Yet, it could be the case 
                                                          
20 Studying individual reactions in this setting might also be relevant for some existing regulations. For instance, 
according to a mandatory quota rule introduced for corporate boards of German listed companies, female candidates 
do not need to be equally qualified as their male competitors in order to be selected according to a quota rule. 
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that individuals have lower expectations specifically about the cooperative performance of the 
other group member (i.e. their willingness to cooperate) rather than, more generally, about their 
overall task performance. Previous research has shown that expectations regarding the 
interaction partner’s cooperation are a crucial determinant of one’s own cooperation (e.g. 
Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003), which might explain the decline in cooperation in a quota- 
compared to performance-based procedure. Future research could include an assessment of 
expectations about cooperativeness of the other group member as a potential underlying factor 
for reduced cooperation. Furthermore, it is worth investigating whether negative side effects can 
also be observed when performance is used as a (secondary) selection criterion within the 
discriminated group.  
Furthermore, in our study the quota rule has consequences not only for the promotion of 
the initially disadvantaged group member, but also for the downgrading of a high-status group 
member. On the one hand, this ensures the internal validity of the study as group size is kept 
constant. On the other hand, this limits the study’s external validity, since in real world settings 
quota admissions do not generally imply demotions of other individuals.21 However, since the 
main analyses did involve data from members of the privileged group only, we would expect the 
effect to be of minor importance. Also, the results of the fairness questionnaire regarding the 
procedure applied to downgraded persons, revealed no differences between the treatments. Still, 
we cannot rule out that this downgrading element could have reduced the external validity of our 
findings due to empathic concerns with the downgraded persons. 
                                                          
21 But see the consequences of mandatory quota rules in Norway: Ahern & Dittmar, 2012. 
SIDE EFFECTS OF QUOTA RULES  
36 
 
Finally, in many real life situations the tasks remain structurally similar before and after 
promotion as in our experimental design. Our results can be generalized to this kind of situations. 
Obviously, promotion procedures might be also applied in circumstances where the promoted 
person performs different tasks before and after promotion. However, given that our effects are 
not driven by expectations, we see no theoretical reason why the results would be different in 
this kind of situations. Nevertheless, this potential moderator could be critically investigated in 
further research. Also, our research focused on the effects of a quota system on behavior in 
situations in which cooperation is defined as the individual act to promote the goals of the group 
and where individual outcomes depend upon the performance of the other group members. This 
type of cooperation was subject of previous studies on the impact of quota rules on cooperation 
(Balafoutas & Sutter, 2012) and it involved interdependence among group members 
implemented by the reward scheme and not by the task in itself (for a discussion on cooperation 
with task vs. reward interdependence see Wageman & Baker, 1997). Future research can 
investigate the effects of quota-based promotion on cooperation in group tasks in which 
individual performance depends upon the efforts or skills of other group members. Such 
situations include a higher degree of interpersonal contact and might therefore mimic real life 
settings more closely. These kinds of tasks might also accrue the benefits of diversity introduced 
through quota-systems in ways not examined in the current research. In the current study 
diversity is unlikely to improve team performance in the task used. This can be concluded from 
recent meta-analyses showing that diversity improves performance in tasks requiring creative or 
innovative outcomes (Bell, Villado, Lukasik, Belau, & Briggs, 2011) and that performance gains 
are limited to task-related diversity but not to bio-demographic diversity, such as gender 
(Horwitz & Horwitz, 2007). These aspects do not apply to our task. Further research is needed to 
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investigate whether or not the negative effects observed in our study also generalize to such 
qualitatively different tasks. A further step would be to investigate the impact of quota-based 
systems on cooperation when task and reward interdependency are introduced jointly. 
Despite some limitations, our research opens up several promising lines of enquiry. 
Future research might focus on identifying alternative solutions to promote gender equality, such 
as “soft quotas” on which the incumbent members of a group deliberately agree, or examine 
whether the provision of additional information (e.g. about the qualifications of candidates) 
lessens the negative impact on group cooperation.  
The 2012 report issued by the European Commission mentioned many positive effects to 
be expected from the introduction of quota systems, such as better team performance, more 
balanced decision-making and spillover effects on other career levels. While evidence suggests 
that these effects are likely to emerge when comparing diverse to non-diverse environments, the 
question remains whether or not gender quotas are the best way to achieve these effects. As 
demonstrated by our research, it is not self-evident what the exact conditions are under which 
they will emerge. What our results do show is that any such initiative requires thorough 
investigation prior to implementation, at the risk of generating negative unintended effects.   
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics of change in cooperation scores by condition in Experiment 1.  
 Performance Quota Total 
Gender 1.14 (4.23, n = 21) -2.00 (4.22, n = 20) -0.39 (4.47) 
Color 1.04 (5.01, n = 26) 0.71 (4.33, n = 24) 0.88 (4.65) 
Total 1.09 (4.63) -0.52 (4.44) 0.31 (4.59) 
 
Note. Individual means and standard deviations in parentheses. Negative scores indicate an increase in 
free-riding or decrease in cooperation. Participants who solved no slider were excluded.
SIDE EFFECTS OF QUOTA RULES  
48 
 
 
Table 2 
Regressions on change in cooperation scores and expectations predicted by condition in 
Experiment 1 and 2. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Change in 
Cooperation 
Score 
Experiment 1 
Change in 
Cooperation 
Score 
Experiment 2 
Change in 
Cooperation 
Score  
Pooled 
Color 0.610 -1.137 -0.440 
(1=color, 0=gender; 
centered) 
(0.889) (0.837) (0.615) 
    
Quota  -1.683+ -1.565+ -1.611* 
(1=quota, 0=performance; 
centered) 
(0.901) (0.842) (0.621) 
    
Quota* Color 2.183 0.480 1.141 
 (1.795) (1.686) (1.233) 
    
Task order 1.476* 1.255* 1.442*** 
 (0.672) (0.517) (0.406) 
    
Replication    -0.145 
(0=Experiment 1, 
1=Experiment 2) 
  (0.616) 
    
Constant -1.330 -1.250* -1.275* 
 (0.823) (0.611) (0.603) 
Observations 91 133 224 
Adjusted R2 0.079 0.037 0.056 
Clusters 47 67 114 
 
Note. Results from an OLS regression with standard errors provided in parentheses. “Task order” indicates the 
number of slider tasks separating both group payment schemes. Standard errors were clustered at the group level. 
Participants who solved no slider were excluded from the analyses. 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.  
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Table 3 
Regressions on procedural fairness perception by condition in Experiment 1 and 2. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Procedural 
Fairness 
Experiment 1 
Procedural 
Fairness 
Experiment 2: 
Overall 
Procedural 
Fairness 
Experiment 2: 
Degraded 
Procedural 
Fairness 
Experiment 2: 
Promoted 
Color 0.918** 0.455+ 0.236 0.473* 
(1=color, 0=gender; 
centered) 
(0.272) (0.238) (0.241) (0.218) 
     
Quota  -0.141 0.0237 -0.0134 -0.741*** 
(1=quota, 
0=performance; 
centered) 
(0.271) (0.237) (0.241) (0.218) 
     
Quota* Color 1.161* 0.302 0.500 0.355 
 (0.543) (0.476) (0.483) (0.436) 
     
Constant 4.668*** 4.374*** 4.417*** 5.057*** 
 (0.135) (0.119) (0.120) (0.109) 
Observations 91 133 133 133 
Adjusted R2 0.127 0.008 -0.008 0.093 
 
Note. Results from an OLS regression with standard errors provided in parentheses. Model 1 refers to the data from 
the Experiment 1. Models 2-4 refer to the data from the Experiment 2. Participants who solved no slider were 
excluded from the analyses. 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.  
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Table 4 
Descriptive statistics of change in cooperation scores by condition in Experiment 2.  
 Performance Quota Total 
Gender 1.19 (4.83, n = 36) -0.60 (4.26, n = 35) 0.31 (4.61) 
Color 0.10 (5.83, n = 30) -1.41 (5.09, n = 32) -0.68 (5.47) 
Total 0.70 (5.29) -0.97 (4.62) -0.15 (5.03) 
 
Note. Individual means and standard deviations in parentheses. Negative scores indicate an increase in 
free-riding or decrease in cooperation. Participants who solved no slider were excluded . 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Group means of change in cooperation scores between the first and second part of the 
experiment (before and after promotion) by experimental condition (categorization criterion: 
color vs. gender; promotion rule: performance vs. quota) in Experiment 1. Bars indicate 95% 
confidence intervals.  
Figure 2. Means of individual responses to the questionnaire on perceived fairness of the 
promotion rule by experimental condition (categorization criterion: color vs. gender; promotion 
rule: performance vs. quota) in Experiment 1. Bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
Figure 3. Group means of change in cooperation scores between the first and second part of the 
experiment (before and after promotion) by experimental condition (categorization criterion: 
color vs. gender; promotion rule: performance vs. quota) in Experiment 2. Bars indicate 95% 
confidence intervals. 
Figure 4. Means of individual responses to the questionnaire on perceived fairness of the overall 
procedure (A), with a focus on the degraded person (B) and promoted person (C) by 
experimental condition (categorization criterion: color vs. gender; promotion rule: performance 
vs. quota) in Experiment 2. Bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
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